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Fox: Preserving Meritorious Claims against Public Corporations: Easing

PRESERVING MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AGAINST
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: EASING THE
HARSHNESS OF NOTICE OF CLAIM
REQUIREMENTS
I.

FROM SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO NOTICE OF CLAIM

The Concept of Sovereign Immunity
It is necessary that a system of law legitimize its own institutions. The English common law legitimized the institution of
monarchy by adopting the doctrine of royal prerogative, which
established for a king a "special pre-eminence . . . over and

above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the
common law, in right of his regal dignity."' It logically follows
from this "that no suit or action can be brought against the king,
even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over
him." 2 Having raised the king to such an ethereal height, it was
not difficult for the English commentators to conclude that "the
king can do no wrong ' 3 and develop the concept of sovereign
immunity.

It is clear that this immunity to civil suit was intended to be4
purely personal to the king by reason of his exalted position.
Unfortunately, in 1788, the conceptual distinction between the
personal role of the king and the functions of administrative bodies had not yet fully matured. It was not difficult, therefore, for
an English court in that year to decide that the formerly exclusive
royal prerogative extended to an unincorporated body called the
County of Devon.5 This widening of a privilege, which had been
applicable to but one person, to the point where it now encompassed hundreds of governmental subdivisions was considered
justified by the theory that "it is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience."o
In America, after 1789, the powers and prerogatives which
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COhmENTARIES *239.
2. Id. at 242.
3. Borchard, Government Liability In Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
4. Id.
5. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). Plaintiff's wagon was damaged
because a bridge belonging to the county was out of repair. The King's Bench decided that
"there is no foundation on which this action can be supported; and if it had intended,
the Legislature would have interfered and given a remedy ....

Id. at 363.

6. Id. at 362.
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the English monarch formerly enjoyed devolved upon the sovereign states and the United States government.' These included
the privilege of immunity to civil suit. In 1812, Massachusetts'
highest court partially immunized that state's public corporations by holding that they could not be liable for injuries that
result from the negligent performance of duties that were imposed
upon them by the legislature."
The Beginning of the Retreat
For a party injured by the negligence of a public corporation' -' to bring suit against that body, it is necessary that the
corporation's cloak of immunity to tort actions be either waived
or abrogated. Waiver is accomplished by the passage of a statute
which consents to the bringing of tort actions against the corporation. Abrogation, in contrast to waiver, is a judicial act. It is
accomplished by overturning, in whole or in part, any earlier
decision in the jurisdiction which had adopted the Russell v. Men
of Devon rule of sovereign immunity.'
In the United States there has been a steady retreat from the
immunity doctrine. Many state legislatures, and those public corporations enabled by the state to engage in the act of legislating
have, however, accompanied the dropping of the immunity barrier with the adoption of conditions precedent to the institution
7. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. &Regional Agricultural Credit Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1936). Justice Frankfurter explained that "[als to the states, legal irresponsibility was written into the Eleventh Amendment; as to the United States, it is derived
by implication." Id. at 388.
8. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). The facts in this case were
similar to those in Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). Plaintiff's horse
was killed as a result of a defect in a bridge which the town of Leicester was obliged to
keep in good repair. Relying upon the Russell case, the court held that public corporations
could not be sued without the statutory permission of the legislature.
8.1. N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw §3 (McKinney 1943) defines "public corporation" as fol-

lows,
1. A "public corporation" includes a municipal corporation, a district
corporation and a public benefit corporation.
2. A "municipal corporation" includes a county, city, town, village and
school district.
3. A "district corporation" includes any territorial division of the state,
other than a municipal corporation . . . which possesses the power to contract
indebtedness and levy taxes or benefit assessments upon real estate or to require
the levy of such taxes or assessments . ...
4. A "public benefit corporation" is a corporation organized to construct
or operate a public improvement wholly or partly within the state, the profits
from which enure to the benefit of this or other states, or to the people thereof.
9. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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of an action against the corporation. One such condition precedent is a notice of claim. Notices of claim are documents (the
contents of which are specified by statute) 0 which must be served
upon the defending public corporation within a specified period
of time following the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Failure to comply with this condition precedent within the time
allowed results in the claimant's cause of action being forever
barred.
In those states in which the sovereign immunity of municipalities and other public corporations has been limited or eliminated it would seem, at first glance, that the continued distinction between suits against individuals and suits against public
corporations, inherent in the notice of claim requirement, is improper under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Two lines of thought have sustained the requirement against such challenge, however, one adhering in states
where sovereign immunity was abolished by legislative action and
the other adhering in states which have followed the judicial route
to abolition. In the states in which legislative acts have made
suits against public corporations possible," it has been held that,
since the legislature might have withheld the right to bring suit
altogether, it could also attach to the right it had conferred such
conditions and limitations as it saw fit to impose. 2 Where sovereign immunity has been abrogated by court action, the notice
requirement has been sustained because of what has been perceived as the legitimate public policy of allowing public corporations to investigate promptly and to settle claims against them
out of court. 3 The California Supreme Court has stated, for example, that, "[to] the extent that immunity is abrogated the
importance of these considerations is increased." 4
The recent legal history of New York in relation to its attempts, both legislative and judicial, to resolve the conflict be10. The contents of a notice typically include a statement of the cause, nature, and
date of the injury, and the amount of damages sought.
11. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970); N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8 (McKinney 1963); Ill. Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
Okla. Governmental Tort Liability Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 1751 et seq. (1965).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952); Szroka
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 171 Minn. 57, 213 N.W. 557 (1927).
13. Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal.2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal. Rptr.
630 (1962); Tonn v. City of Helena, 42 Mont. 127, 111 P. 715 (1910).
14. Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal.2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 335, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 631 (1962).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 4

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

tween the need to protect the public treasury and the countervailing policy of compensating those injured by the negligence of
others presents an illustrative case study.
R-. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF A HARSH NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE:
NEW YORK'S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

§ 50-e.

New York is one of those states which has waived its own
immunity, and that of its subdivisions, through an act of the
legislature."5 It has also provided, by way of General Municipal
Law § 50-e [hereinafter referred to as § 50-el that:'6
In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required
by law as a condition precedent to the commencement of an
action or special proceeding against a public corporation, .. .
or any officer, appointee or employee thereof, the notice shall
comply with the provisions of this section and it shall be given
within ninety days after the claim arises.
Even though the state of New York has consented to have its
own liability "determined in accordance with the same laws and
rules as [are] applied to actions in the [New York State] supreme court against individuals and corporations... ,", it has,
through the operation of § 50-e, established a distinction between
suits against certain public corporations, and all other entities
and individuals. This statute creates a drastically shortened statute of limitations period when an action is brought against a
public corporation rather than any other type of defendant. The
New York statute of limitations period for an action to recover
damages for injury to property or person, or to recover damages
for an act of malpractice, is normally three years.'" The effect of
§ 50-e is to telescope the limitation period to a mere ninety days.
The Roots of § 50-e
After the first breaches were made in the wall of sovereign
immunity, but before the adoption of the notice requirement,
New York municipalities protected themselves against the financial impact of tort liability in the same way as any private citizen
or business-by taking out insurance. This means of protection
became impractical as increasing municipal activity resulted in
15. N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
16. N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 50-e, subd. 1 (McKinney 1965).
17. N.Y. CT.CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
18. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1972).
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ever greater exposure of governmental subdivisions to tort suits.
Further, the courts responded to the growth of governmental involvement in the average citizen's life with an increased willingness to grant relief to individuals who were injured as a result of
municipal negligence.19 As a result of these developments, those
public corporations which could do so adopted conditions precedent to actions in tort (and often to other forms of action as well)
which were brought against them.2"
The function of notice of claim requirements is not to trap
unwary claimants, though this is their effect. 21 The essential purposes of the requirement are the same as those which have been
held to justify it against the claims of violating the fourteenth
22
amendment's equal protection guarantee:
1) to afford the public corporation an opportunity to make
an early investigation of the claim while the facts surrounding
it are still fresh, thereby protecting the corporation against
fraudulent and stale claims; and,
2) to give the public corporation an opportunity to settle
meritorious claims out of court where that is desirable and expedient.
Proposal of the 1943 JudicialConference
The 1943 New York Judicial Councilz' issued a report" in
19. See, e.g., Loughran v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 320, 83 N.E. 2d 136 (1948) for
a reaffirmation of New York's rule regarding liability of a municipality for injuries incurred by pedestrians as a result of a hole or depression in a sidewalk of less than four
inches indepth.
20. Of course, only those public corporations with the ability to legislate, such as
cities and villages, could adopt such conditions precedent. For a discussion of the development of such conditions precedent, see Note, General MunicipalLaw Sections 50-e and
50-i: Limitationson Litigation, 11 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 269 (1960).
21. S. SAto & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNmENT LAw 1141 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as SATO].
22. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text; N.Y. JuD. CouNcm, NnrrH ANN.
REP. 227 (1943); SATO, supra note 21 at 1141.
23. The New York Judicial Council was created by an act of the New York State
legislature (L. of N.Y. 1934, ch. 128). It was composed of a member of the bar of each
judicial department, two citizens from the state at large, the chief judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding justices of each appellate division of the New York State supreme
court, the chairmen and ranking minority members of the New York State Senate's and
Assembly's Committee on the Judiciary, and the chairmen of the New York State Senate's
and Assembly's Committee on Codes. The Council was required by its enabling statute
to publish an annual report to the legislature recommending legislative actions to improve
the administration of justice. The Judicial Council's reports of 1943 and 1944 contained
recommendations which gave birth to General Municipal Law § 50-e.
24. N.Y. Jun. CoNcm, NINTH ANN. REp. 227 (1943).
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which it proposed and drafted a model notice of claim statute
from which § 50-e was adopted. It is worthwhile to examine that
report and the proposed model statute, for had the statute been
adopted without change, at least part of the current harshness of
§ 50-e would have never arisen.
In the Judicial Council's Report, published in 1943, is an
extensive study of the notice of claim requirements of sixty-two
New York State city charters.2 5 The study revealed a bewildering
and varied array of laws which all too often served "as a trap for
the unwary and the ignorant.

'2

The various charter provisions

were found to be inconsistent as to the causes of action that only
could be initiated by first filing a timely notice of claim, the
information to be contained in such a notice, and the period of
time allowed for the delivery of the notice.
Worst of all, some of the charter provisions were found to
contain requirements which varied with the type of action being
brought. For example, in White Plains, in 1943, notice of claim
for all personal injury cases had to be filed within ten days of the
injury's occurrence and had to contain a notice of intent to claim
damages, as well as a description of the time, place, and extent
of the injury. With respect to all actions for damages to person
or property arising out of misfeasance or negligence, however, a
notice of claim had to meet not only all of the above requirements, but also had to be made under oath and had to include a
statement of the circumstances under which the injury occurred. 7
The courts required these early notice of claim statutes to be
complied with meticulously if the action was not to be barred.
Their decisions, according to the Council Report, too often turned
on "technicalities" which prevented the disposition of honest
claims on their merits. 9
The dominant aims of the proposed act, according to the
1943 Judicial Council's comments to it, were consistency, greater
leniency for the benefit of the meritorious claimant, and protec25. Id. at 246-58.
26. Note, Municipal Corporations:Infancy as an Excuse for Failure to Comply with
Statutory Provisionsfor the Filing of Claims, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 687, 689 (1932).
27. L. of N.Y. 1915, ch. 356, § 277.
28. Note, Renewed Recommendations for Revision of Section 50-e of the General
MunicipalLaw, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 318 (1950); Johannes v. City of New York, 257 App.
Div. 197, 12 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 281 N.Y. 825, 24 N.E.2d 489 (1939);
Purdy v. City of New York, 193 N.Y. 521, 86 N.E. 560 (1908).
29. N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL, NINTH ANN. REP. 227 (1943); N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL, TENTH ANN.
REP. 265 (1944).
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tion against fraud for municipal treasuries.'" The Council intended that notice of claim provisions be applied to all causes of
action brought against the protected corporations." It rejected
the suggestion of Professor Edwin M. Borchard12 that the period
for serving a notice be limited to thirty days, and instead adopted
a longer ninety day period. The longer period was believed to be
reasonable while a shorter one, it was feared, would produce inequitable results without conferring any extra benefit upon municipal and district corporations."
The notice period was not immutable. It could be extended
"in the discretion of the court, ' 34 and the claimant could "be
granted leave to serve the notice within a reasonable time after
3
the expiration of such time"" upon a showing that:
1) reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice
within such time existed;
2) the other party had "actual knowledge of the essential
facts constituting the claim" prior to the time period; and
3) the other party was not prejudiced by the failure to
timely serve.
In addition, failure to timely serve could be excused on the specific grounds of infancy and mental or physical incapacity. 7 In
the event of such incapacity, notice could be served within a
reasonable time after the disability had ceased."
The scope of the power to amend, and the ease with which a
defective notice of claim could be amended, afforded an aggrieved
plaintiff great protection. Under the proposed statute, notice
could not be deemed insufficient due to an error in its contents
or in the manner of its service, provided that there was no intention on the part of the claimant to mislead the other party, and
that the other party was not in fact misled by the error.39 If the
notice happened to be defective, the proposed statute would re30. N.Y.

JuD. CouNcm, NINTH ANN. REP. 227, 229-45 (1943).
31. Crowley v. City of New York, 189 Misc. 170, 70 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1947).
32. Professor Edwin M. Borchard's article, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), remains to this day the foremost work on sovereign immunity.
33. N.Y. JuD. CouNciL, NInrh ANN. REP. 227, 231 (1943).
34. Id. at 228.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 228, 239.
37. Id. at 228.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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quire the receiving party to return it to the claimant with due
diligence and the claimant would have ten days in which to resubmit a corrected copy.4" If the defendant failed to return a
defective notice to the claimant, he would not be able to assert a
defense based on such defect." The possibility of errors occurring
in the first instance, it was hoped, would be reduced by the standardization of the content of notices and by a reduction in42 the
number of notices needed to be served in any claim to one.
In addition to the specific provisions of the proposed statute,
there was a direction given to the judiciary, and an implied warning to the protected corporations, that, "[tihis section shall be
liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the
parties."4 3
The Legislative Response
The law passed by the legislature in 194511 was much harsher
than the one recommended by the Judicial Council. It provided
for a sixty day filing period, applicable only to tort actions, which
was absolute. Substantial compliance with the time allowed was
not enough.45 Infancy, death, and mental or physical incapacity
could result in permission to file a late notice upon a showing that
such circumstances were the actual cause of the failure on the
part of the claimant to timely file.4" Amendment could only be
achieved by motion to the court. Such motion could only be made
before the trial of an action, and would be accepted only if the
good faith of the claimant when he made the error, and lack of
prejudice to the defendant by the acceptance of the amendment,
could be shown. 47 Amendment was limited to the contents of the
notice, and could not be utilized for the purpose of correcting
improper service. 4 The Judicial Council's proposal that defective
notices be returned to the claimant for correction and resubmission was not adopted. 9
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 228, 232. Thus, the problem encountered with the multiple White Plains
statutes (note 27 supra and accompanying text) would have been eliminated.
43. Id. at 229.
44. L. of N.Y. 1945, ch. 694, § 1, as amended,N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1965).

45. Id.§ 1(1).
46. Id. § 1(5).
47. Id. § 1(6).
48. Id.
49. Note that it will probably never reappear, since its adoption would result in an
enormous administrative burden upon the City of New York.
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The Legislature Attempts to Escape from the Harshness of its
Creation
The Draconian nature of the original statute gradually became obvious to the legislature. In 1950 the filing period was
extended from sixty days to the originally proposed ninety days,"
and the period for amending the notice was enlarged to include
the time of the trial on the merits, in addition to the previously
allowed pretrial period."
The New York legislature has slowly but significantly continued to change § 50-e so as to give a greater degree of justice to
those whose valid claims would otherwise have been denied relief
by the original statute's harsh requirements. Improperly served
notice is now sufficient, "if such notice is actually received [by
the person designated to receive such notice] and such party
against whom the claim is made shall cause the claimant or any
other person designated by the claim to be examined in regard
to such claim. 5 2 Reliance upon written settlement offers made by
the defendant to the claimant or his insurer now stands beside
infancy and mental or physical incapacity as an excuse for the
untimely filing of notice.53 The time for amendment of the notice
was enlarged again in 1966 to include "[a]ny time after the date
of service of the notice of claim" in addition to the earlier extended period. 4
Judicial Support for the Legislative Trend
For the last thirty years the New York State legislature has
been trying to escape from the harshness of its original creation.
The general thrust of this reform has been in the direction of
lessening the rigidity of the requirement that notice must be properly served, extending the time period for giving of notice and
amendment of notice, and enlarging the number of circumstances
that will justify the giving of late notice.
The New York State judiciary has supported and advanced
50. L. of N.Y. 1950, ch. 481, § 1(1), N.Y. GE. MuNc. LAw § 50-e subd. 1 (McKinney

1965).
51. Id. § 1(6).
52. L. of N.Y. 1951, ch. 393, § 1, N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAW § 50-e, subd. 3 (McKinney
1965).
53. L. of N.Y. 1959, ch. 814,§ 1, N.Y. GEN. MuNIc. LAW § 50-e, subd. 5 (McKinney
1965).
54. L. of N.Y. 1966, ch. 732, N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW § 50-e, subd. 6 (McKinney Supp.
1974), amending, N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAW § 50-e, subd. 6 (McKinney 1965). See note 47
supra and accompanying text.
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this legislative trend by allowing documents that are functionally, but not technically, notices to be amended so that they can
serve as such,55 by adopting ingenious doctrines for calculating
the date on which a cause of action accrued with the result that
the period of limitation is often extended," and by excusing the
timely notice of claim requirement for an increasing number of
claimants. The latter trend has been particularly true in cases
5
involving infant claimants. 1
By way of a hypothetical fact pattern, not dissimilar to many
actual cases involving § 50-e, let us examine the current effect of
that section of the law on potential claimants: Johnny went to
school one day. While he was playing in the yard somebody hit
him on the head with a pipe. His father was so incensed by this
occurrence that he sent a letter to the board of education. One
hundred days later somebody told Johnny's father that he should
have sued. The father took Johnny to see a lawyer. By allowing
ninety days to elapse, Johnny has not met the requirements of §
50-e.
Preservationof the Claim through Amendment
The New York courts may allow an amendment of the father's letter, or of the accident report that the school required
Johnny to fill out in quadruplicate, so that it meets the standards
of a timely filed notice of claim." Acceptance of such a letter as
a timely filed notice of claim is conditioned upon whether it fulfills the chief purpose of a notice, that of making the corporation
aware of the existence of a potential claim against it." It must be
established as well that such notice was actually received by
someone who is authorized to receive it.6" The latter restriction is
necessitated by the proscription against amendment of service.' 1
Supporting the judicial attempt to preserve the otherwise
lost rights of meritorious claimants are those decisions which
have allowed a notice of claim filed by a third party (whose inter55. See notes 58-63 infra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 64-67 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 68-76 infra and accompanying text.

58. Chikara v. City of New York, 21 Misc.2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 App. Div.2d 862, 199 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't
1960); Baxter v. Turner, 111 N.Y.S. 10 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1952).
59. Montana v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 23 App. Div.2d 585, 586, 256
N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (2d Dep't 1965).

60. Horowitz v. Village of Monticello, 18 App. Div.2d 947, 237 N.Y.S.2d 660 (3d Dep't
1963).

61. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 50-e, subd. 6 (McKinney 1965).
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est is derived from the claimant's) to be amended so that it can
serve as sufficient notice on behalf of the claimant himself. For
example, a notice of claim filed by the claimant's insurance carrier, where the carrier has a contingent interest in the claimant's
cause of action, has been held to be sufficient as to the claimant
if the claimant was actually examined after the filing of notice. 2
Likewise, a bailee's notice of claim which alleged, in part, that
the city's negligence caused the bailee's warehouse to be destroyed by fire and the bailor's property located therein to be
consumed by the blaze, was deemed sufficient as to the bailor's
claim. 3 These decisions are justified by the reasonable assumption that any investigation of the third party's claim will necessarily cover the same ground as an investigation of the plaintiff's
claim.
Calculating the Time of Accrual so as to Preserve the Claim
Additionally, the courts have overcome the barrier to claims
presented by the ninety day filing period. Whether a claim has
been timely asserted is a question of fact which, if in dispute, bars
dismissal of the claim.64 The likelihood of such disputes, however,
has been increased by the development of doctrines, favorable to
claimants, that fix the date on which the cause of action is
deemed to have accrued at a time after the date of injury. It has
been held, for example, that causes of action for false imprisonment accrue on the date that each individual imprisonment
comes to an end rather than on the day each began. 5 In the case
of an action for malpractice that is brought against a municipal
hospital, it has been held that the date of accrual is the date of
the final treatment rather than the date on which the malpractice
occurred, provided that the treatment has been continuous from
the time of the incident of malpractice."6 Finally, it has been held
62. See Verley v. City of New York, 11 App. Div.2d 1015, 206 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dep't
1960).
63. Travis Fabrics, Inc. v. Lee Dyeing Co. of Johnstown, 68 Misc.2d 549, 327
N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1971).
64. See Eagle Vending Corp. v. Bd. of Ed., 41 App. Div.2d 849, 342 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d
Dep't 1973).
65. Schildhaus v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.2d 853, 218 N.E.2d 325, 271 N.Y.S.2d
286 (1966); Allee v. City of New York, 42 App. Div.2d 899, 347 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep't
1973). In Schildhaus, plaintiff put forth the theory that in cases of false imprisonment the
ninety day limitation period should be calculated from the ultimate date of acquittal on
charges for which the imprisonment had been instituted. This theory of the date of accrual, which would have resulted in an even longer period during which § 50-e's requirements could be fulfilled, was rejected by the court.
66. Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
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that a continuing tort may be deemed to have arisen anew each
time it occurred, and thus, no more than one notice of claim need
be filed for it.67
Excusing Late Notice of Claim by Reason of Infancy
Infancy is one of the statutory excuses for filing a late notice
of claim.18 Determining the age at which a claimant's late filing
can be excused by the condition of infancy has long been a troublesome problem for the New York judiciary. Illinois courts long
ago exempted all infants from the requirement of filing a timely
notice of claim 9 despite the fact that the state's notice of claim
statute contains no express exceptions that justify late filing."0
Until the recent case of Murray v. City of New York,71 New York's
courts had presumed immature infancy to be a form of physical
and mental disability which would excuse failure to timely file a
notice.72 An infant of five years was considered to be an immature
infant, while an infant of twenty years could not be said to suffer
from the disability. The existence of this disability in persons
of five and twenty could be determined only
between the ages
73
after litigation.

The Murray case confronted the New York Court of Appeals
with the plight of a nineteen year old late-filing infant. George
Murray had been injured while motorcycling. He was admitted
for treatment to a municipal hospital. There an operation was
(1962); Gnoj v. City of New York, 29 App. Div. 2d 404, 288 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't 1968).
The value of the continuous treatment doctrine to the poor and incarcerated, who deal
almost exclusively with medical facilities affected by § 50-e, cannot be overestimated.
67. Hackensack Water Co. v. Village of Nyack, 289 F. Supp. 671, 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). This suit arose from continuing damage to plaintiff, a New Jersey water company,
by reason of defendant village's diversion of upstream waters. Notice of claim was filed
by plaintiff on May 22, 1967 although the complaint sought money damages from May
1966. The court ruled that a continuing trespass is deemed to have "arisen anew" each
day it goes on. Therefore, only those injuries occurring more than ninety days prior to May
22, 1967 were excluded from potential recovery.
68. N.Y. GE. Mumc. LAW § 50-e, subd. 5 (McKinney 1965).
69. McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52,120 N.E. 476 (1918); Wills v. Metz,
89 Ill. App.2d 338, 231 N.E.2d 628 (1967).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-102, 103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
71. 30 N.Y.2d 113, 282 N.E.2d 103, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1972).
72. See, e.g., Murphy v. Village of Ft. Edward, 213 N.Y. 397, 107 N.E. 716 (1915). In
that case, the failure of a five year old infant's guardian ad litem to timely file a notice of
claim on her behalf did not result in the action being barred. The notice period was sixty
days and the notice was filed twenty-three months after the injury.
73. Cf. Brooks v. Rensselaer County, 34 App. Div.2d 708, 309 N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't
1970); Borowski v. Town of Clarence, 19 App. Div.2d 580, 240 N.Y.S.2d 379 (4th Dep't
1963); Ascencio v. City of New York, 216 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
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performed upon his leg which caused a severe infection and resulted in an osteomyelitic condition. Nine months after the "infant's" discharge from the municipal hospital he filed a notice
alleging malpractice on the part of the city hospital. The court
74
ruled that:
An infant of 19 may indeed lack the acumen to appreciate the
source, or for that matter, the nature of the wrong allegedly
perpetrated against him and, consequently, have been remiss in
the proper assertion of his legal rights. The impediment may
reasonably be presumed to attend infancy; there is no requirement that it be factually demonstrated ....
Despite a prior divergence of approach among lower courts,75
the Murray court made it clear that a presumption will now exist
that all infants are incapable of timely filing a notice of claim.7"
While this presumption may be overcome by submission of contrary evidence, 77 the door has been opened for discretionary allow74. 30 N.Y.2d 113, 120, 282 N.E.2d 103, 107-08, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (1972).

75. The First Department required that causation of late filing by infancy be factually demonstrated. Clark v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 34 App.
Div.2d 770, 311 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1970); Biberias v. City of New York, 33 App.
Div.2d 671, 305 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't 1969), rev'd. and remitted for findings, 27 N.Y.2d
890, 265 N.E.2d 775, 317 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1970); Shankman v. New York City Housing
Auth., 21 App. Div. 2d 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 500, 208
N.E.2d 175, 260 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1965); Goglas v. New York City Housing Auth., 13 App.
Div.2d 939, 216 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1961), afl'd, 11 N.Y.2d 680, 180 N.E.2d 910, 225
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1962); Schnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1130, 141 N.Y.S.2d 88
(1st Dep't 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 697, 134 N.E.2d 69, 150 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1956).
Other departments, however, often presumed inability to timely file from the fact of
infancy. Shane v. County of Albany, 20 App. Div.2d 746, 246 N.Y.S.2d 837 (3d Dep't
1964); Pandoliano v. New York City Transit Auth., 17 App. Div.2d 951, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 99
(2d Dep't 1962); Wenz v. Bd. of Educ., 16 App. Div.2d 930, 229 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2d Dep't
1962); Abruzzo v. City of New York, 10 App. Div.2d 638, 196 N.Y.S.2d 907 (2d Dep't 1960);
Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 773 (2d Dep't 1955);
Every v. County of Ulster, 280 App. Div. 155, 112 N.Y.S.2d 367 (3d Dep't 1952), rev'd and
remitted for findings, 304 N.Y. 924, 110 N.E.2d 741 (1953), findings made and reversal
adhered to, 281 App. Div. 1060, 122 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't 1953); Hogan v. City of
Cohoes, 279 App. Div. 282, 110 N.Y.S.2d 3 (3d Dep't 1952).
76. It did not, however, remove from infants the duty to file a notice of claim prior
to instituting an action. See Camarella v. E. Irondequoit School Bd., 34 N.Y.2d 139, 313
N.E.2d 29, 356 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1974). Note also that subsequent to the Murray decision,
the New York legislature lowered the age of majority to eighteen for almost all purposes
(see L. of N.Y. 1974, chs. 889-940). Presumably, the Murray decision should now be read
as applying to persons under eighteen years of age.
77. [A] determination as to a cognizable relation between infancy and the
delay is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised
in light of all the facts and circumstances in a given case . . ..
Murray v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 113, 119, 282 N.E.2d 103, 107, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14
(1974).
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ance of a number of meritorious suits that would have been otherwise summarily dismissed. Indeed, the trend may be for courts
to recognize the harshness of § 50-e as being unjust and to allow
as many meritorious "infants" as possible to bring suits, despite
their failure to timely file a notice of claim.78 Hence, many more
meritorious smaller claims which might otherwise not be filed
may be preserved, and more frequent out-of-court settlements
may occur. Such results would carry forward the Judicial Council's original purposes.79
1Il.

§ 50-e:

CONTINUING AND INCREASING DIFFICULTIES

Despite the efforts of the New York legislature and judiciary
to ease the harshness of General Municipal Law § 50-e, it still
remains an often fatal obstacle to many claimants who would
otherwise be entitled to relief. The statutory period poses a formidable barrier to those whose knowledge of the legal system is least
developed, and to those whose contact with lawyers is most infrequent. It may at least be argued, however, that the loss of these
claims is justified as a necessary means of protecting the public
treasury, for without the time limit the ability of the municipal
corporation to ferret out fraudulent claims through prompt investigation will be lost.
Injustice seems even more acute in those cases involving
claims which are lost because of errors in the notice of claim
which cannot be amended. Unamendable errors in the notice of
claim come in two varieties. First, there are those errors whose
amendment the court would deem prejudicial to the defendant.
Second, there are those errors involving the manner of service of
the notice of claim. As to the first, the problem of determining
when an amendment is, or is not, prejudicial to the defendant has
been a source of great confusion to the courts and has occasionally
resulted in absurdly contradictory decisions." Professor David D.
Siegel has proposed a rational, general, procedural standard
78. See, e.g., Potter v. Board of Ed., 43 App. Div.2d 248, 350 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't
1974); Peterson v. City of New York, 73 Misc.2d 618, 341 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1973).
79. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
80. Compare Klein v. City of New York, 189 Misc. 48, 73 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1947), where it was held that amending the number borne on a bus involved
in an accident from 806 to 811 was prejudicial to the defendant, with the earlier case of
Turner v. City of New York, 185 Misc. 1012, 61 N.Y.S.2d 199 (City Ct. N.Y. County 1945)
where an amendment to change a trolley car number from 5060 to 6050 was held to be
not in the least prejudicial to the defendant.
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which some courts have utilized to solve this problem. He suggests that "the underlying question is whether the earlier document gave adequate notice of the underlying event." 8 ' It has followed from Siegel's rule that a previously filed notice of a personal injury may be amended to include an action for wrongful
death that results from the same injury," and that a husband's
notice of claim for losses arising from his wife's injury may be
amended to include the wife's personal injury action. 3 It is impossible to reconcile the rule, however, with cases that have held
that a notice for a property damage claim may not be amended
to include an action for personal injury, 4 or that a notice filed for
false arrest may not be amended to include a malicious prosecu5
tion action.
The explanation for these otherwise inexplicable results lies
not in the caprice of judicial reasoning, but in the vagaries of the
word "prejudice" as it is used in subdivision six of General Municipal Law § 50-e.8 ' That the meaning of this word has been the
subject of an extraordinary amount of litigation, 87 and that the
results of these frequent efforts fail to be logically reconcilable,
should put us on notice that a new standard upon which to make
a determination of when to allow a proposed amendment must be
found.88
The second source of error as to the notice of claim involves
the manner of service. The failure of the adopted version of § 5081. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3025(b), Practice Commentary 3025:12 (McKinney 1974).
82. Holmes v. City of New York, 269 App. Div. 95, 54 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't), affd,
295 N.Y. 615, 64 N.E.2d 449 (1945).
83. Charlemagne v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 689, 102 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 871, 100 N.E.2d 52 (1951).
84. LaRocco v. City of New York, 29 N.Y.2d 687, 274 N.E.2d 751, 325 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1971).
85. Grant v. City of Rochester, 68 Misc.2d 358, 326 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1971).
86. [A] mistake, omission, irregularity or defect made in good faith in the
notice of claim required to be served by this section, not pertaining to the
manner or time of service thereof, may be corrected, supplied or disregarded as
the case may be in the discretion of the court provided it shall appear that the
other party was not prejudiced thereby.
N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 50-e, subd. 6 (McKinney 1965).
87. Sanchez v. City of New York, 25 App. Div.2d 731, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 732 (1st Dep't
1966); Charlemagne v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 689, 102 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't
1951); Davidson v. New York City Housing Auth., 56 Misc.2d 635, 289 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1968); Gersyl Corp. v. City of New York, 10 Misc.2d 88, 167 N.Y.S.2d
488 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956); O'Lear v. City of Yonkers, 189 Misc. 115, 73 N.Y.S.2d
550 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1947).
88. See section IV infra for further discussion.
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e to include any provision allowing for the amendment of "the
manner or time of service" 89 is an increasing source of hardship
and injustice. Since the provisions of § 50-e are applicable wherever "a notice of claim is required by law as a condition precedent
to the commencement of an action or special proceeding. .. '"
few public corporations have missed the opportunity to be included within the protective boundaries of the statute. It has of
course, been applied to all of the counties,9 towns,9" and villages 3
of New York. Unfortunately § 50-e has also been adopted by
entities that injured parties are not likely to perceive as being
protected by the statute. Before a tort action may be commenced
against these entities, a notice of claim must be served for example, upon the New York City Sports Authority,94 the New York
City Transit Authority,95 the New York State Sports Authority,"
the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation,97 all the
state school districts, boards of education and their employees, 9
public housing authorities,99 and even upon the Westchester
County Playland Commission.' 0 The predicament of the meritorious claimant becomes more difficult when we learn that city
charters may adopt the requirements of § 50-e and apply them
to public officers for whom the city is not obligated to provide
compensation.' 01
Attorneys must be aware that, though not easily ascertained,
the possibility exists that the public corporation or the employee
89. N.Y. GEN. MuNic.

LAW

§ 50-e, subd. 1 (McKinney 1965).

90. Id.
91. N.Y. CouNTr LAW § 52 (McKinney 1972).
92. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 67 (McKinney 1965).
93. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 9802 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (formerly N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 341b).
94. N.Y. Pus. AuTH.
95.
96.
97.
98.

LAW

§ 2520 (McKinney Supp. 1974).

N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1212, subd. 2 (McKinney 1970).
N.Y. Pus. AuTH. LAW § 2481 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7401 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813 (McKinney 1970).

99. N.Y. Pus. Hous. LAW § 157, subd. 2 (McKinney 1955).
100. See Pekar v. Westchester County Playland Comm'n, 190 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), wherein the court relied on § 50-e in holding that plaintiff could not bring an action
against a public benefit corporation without giving proper notice.
101. See Siegel v. Epstein, 21 App. Div.2d 821, 251 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1964),
aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 639, 216 N.E.2d 341, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 138 (1966) wherein the charter of the
City of Long Beach was held to require that a notice of claim be served on the municipality
before an action could be commenced against the Marshal of the City of Long Beach,
despite the fact that the city was not obligated to reimburse him for tort liability incurred
by him during the course of his duties. This holding resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's
causes of action for wrongful eviction and conversion.
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against whom the suit is brought may be insulated by the notice
of claim requirement..They must repeatedly search through state
laws and city ordinances to determine whether service is neces-

sary and who is designated to receive

it.112

The proliferation of

General Municipal Law § 50-e has defeated its original purpose:
"to effect uniformity throughout the state as to the requirements
for notice of claims."'' 3 It has instead become "a trap for the
104
unwary and the ignorant.)
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The confusion and hardship caused by General Municipal
Law § 50-e should not be allowed to continue. The law should be
reformed in at least two ways. First, its application should be
limited to a few large municipal corporations, perhaps only to
cities, towns, villages and counties. The requirement of service,
and the method of service upon these corporations should be
contained in a single provision of law. The result of this reform
1 5
would be to end the unjustified proliferation of the statute. 1 It
is doubtful that a sports authority will be subjected to more tort
claims than a large department store. There is no justifiable reason to give such a quasi-governmental institution greater protection than a private business establishment. On the other hand,
there is also no reason to drop the notice of claim requirement
entirely, since it may afford valuable and perhaps necessary protection for municipal treasuries. The advantages of municipal
investigation and the possibility of out of court settlements serve
both the public interest and that of the meritorious claimant.
A second recommended reform is one that would bring back
the mild amendment provisions of the draft of § 50-e proposed by
the Judicial Council in 1943 to replace subdivision six of the
current law.' 6 The 1943 proposal contained two major advantages: it allowed amendment of defective service and thereby
prevented the disqualification of otherwise meritorious claims on
a technicality, and it did not condition the acceptance of an
amendment on the vague word "prejudice." Instead it required
that acceptance of an amendment be based upon an appearance
102. In the absence of a statute that otherwise determines who is to receive service
of the notice of claim, the provisions of N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 311 (McKinney 1972) are applied.
103. N.Y. JuD. CouNciL, NINr ANN. REP. 227 (1943).
104. Id.
105. See text accompanying notes 23-43, supra.
106. N.Y. JuD. Coumcm, NINTH ANN. REP. 227, 228 (1943).
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"that there was no intention to mislead the other party and that
10 7
such party was not, in fact, misled thereby."
If we are to justify the preservation of the special protection
provided to inunicipalities by notice of claim requirements, then
these laws must be drafted and interpreted in a manner that
affords relief to the meritorious claimant while thwarting deception and fraud so as to protect the municipal treasury. By allowing the municipal corporation to make an early investigation of
claims, General Municipal Law § 50-e accomplishes the latter. It
fails, however, as to the former and should, therefore, be reformed
in the manner suggested.
Mark J. Fox
107. Id.
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